A quantitative analysis of the effect of the Group Areas Act on residential property prices in Pietermaritzburg. by Blades, Michael Alan.
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT 
OF THE GROUP AREAS ACT ON RESIDENTIAL 
PROPERTY PRICES IN PIETERMARITZBURG 
by 
MICHAEL ALAN BLADES 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master 




I am indebted to my supervisor, Mr George Oldham, for re.a.ding the drafts of this 
dissertation so thoroughly and perspicuously. His constructive criticism has improved this 
dissertation. 
I would also like to express gratitude to the employees of the Estates Department in 
Pietermaritzburg for their assistance in the collection of the data and Pietermaritzburg 2000 
for funding this exercise. Lastly a word of thanks to members of the Economics 
Department, my friends and parents for their special brand of encouragement. 
DECLARATION 
I hereby declare that this whole dissertation, unless specifically indicated to the contrary in 
the text, is my own original work, and has not been submitted for a degree at any other 
University. 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABS 1'RA CT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
INTRODUCTION ....................................... .... 2 
CHAPTER 1: PROPERTY VALUATION AND THE DETERMINATION OF 
RA TES INCIDENCE IN PIETERMARITZBURG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
1 The determination of rates incidence in Pietermaritzburg . . . . . . . . . 4 
1.1 Changes in property values and rates incidence in the residential areas . 5 
1.1.1 THE 1985/86 PROPERTY REVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
1.1.2 THE 1989/90 PROPERTY REVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
1.2 Conclusion and statement of hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
CHAPTER 2 : THEORIES ON THE DETERMINATION OF HOUSE PRICES IN 
URBAN HOUSING MARKETS ........................... 13 
2 Traditional theory on urban housing markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
2.1 Lancastrian demand theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13  
2.2 Constructing Lancastrian characteristics for the housing market . . . . . 18 
2. 3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
2.4 Problems with the model ............................. 2 1
2.5 The use of the hedonic price equation in this study 2 2
2. 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
CHAPTER 3 : EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
3 Sources of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5
3 .1 Description of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
3.2 Specification of the models ........................... 2 6
3.2.1 PROBLEMS WITH DATA SPECIFICATION ........... 26 
3.2.2 PROBLEMS WITH CHOICE OF FUNCTIONAL FORM .... 27 
3.3 Model specification concerning the entire sample .............. 30 
3.3.1 FUNCTIONAL FORMS OF THE MODEL ............ 3 1
3.3.2 STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE MODELS .... 3 3
3.3.3 ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MODEL ...... 3 3
3.3.4 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL .......... 37 
3.4 Separating the model into separate Group areas ............... 37 
3.5 Model specification concerning the equations for the separate Group 
areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
3.5.1 FUNCTIONAL FORMS OF THE MODEL .... ........ 40 
3.5.2 STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE MODELS .... 43 
3.5.2.1 · The White Areas .................... 43 
3.5.2.2 The Indian Areas .................... 43 
3.5.3 ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE MODELS ...... 44 
3.5.4 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS OF THE SEPARATE MODELS .. 51 
CHAPTER 4 : CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 52 
4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
iii 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
iv 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 1 CHANGES TN ASSESSED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES 6 
TABLE 1.1 CHANGES IN RA TES INCOME IN 11:IE RESIDENTIAL AREAS 8 
TABLE 1.2 RATIOS OF WHITE PROPERTY VALUES AND WHITE RATES INCOME 
TO INDIAN AND COLOURED PROPERTY VALUES AND RATES 
INCOME RESPECTIVELY 9 
TABLE 1.3 RANDAGES SET ON RESIDENTIAL LAND AND BUILDINGS 
IN PIETERMARITZBURG 9 
TABLE 3 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE 
TABLE 3.1 INTERPRETING THE COEFFICIENTS OF THE CONTINUOUS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR THE LINEAR, LOG-LINEAR 
32 
AND LOG-LOG FUNCTIONAL FORMS 35 
TABLE 3.2 INTERPRETING THE COEFFICIENTS OF THE DUMMY 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR THE LINEAR, LOG-LINEAR 
AND LOG-LOG FUNCTIONAL FORMS 35 
TABLE 3.3 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE SEPARATE GROUP 
AREAS 42 
TABLE 3.4 INTERPRETING THE COEFFICIENTS OF THE CONTINUOUS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR THE LINEAR, LOG-LINEAR 
AND LOG-LOG FUNCTIONAL FORMS OF TI:IE WHITE AND 
INDIAN AREAS RESPECTIVELY 46 
TABLE 3.5 INTERPRETING THE COEFFICIENTS OF THE INDEPENDENT 
DUMMY VARIABLES FOR TI:IE LINEAR, LOG-LINEAR AND 
LOG-LOG FUNCTIONAL FORMS 47 
TABLE 3.6 ESTIMATES OF WHITE AND INDIAN LAND RATE DIFFERENTIALS 




FIGURE 2.0 THE '!WO-STAGE OPTIMIZATION PROCEDURE 16 
V 
ABSTRACT 
When the 1989/90 property valuation roll was implemented for the City of Pietermaritzburg, 
substantial dissatisfaction was expressed by the Indian and Coloured ratepayers. They argued 
that the Group Areas Act was preventing the efficient functioning of the property market. 
This caused property prices in the Indian and Coloured areas to increase dramatically, which 
in turn affected the property rating system in an inequitable fashion. 
Using econometric methods, this dissertation attempts to evaluate these claims. 
Unfortunately, no data concerning the Coloured areas were available at the time of sampling 
and so the quantitative analysis does not concern the Coloured areas. The data for the Indian 
and White areas were obtained from the local municipality in Pietermaritzburg. Within a 
Lancastrian demand theory framework, house prices are regressed against various 
components of a house. The technique known as hedonic price estimation gives coefficients 
of the independent variables which can be used to determine monetary values for each 
component. Two models are presented. In the first model, a Group Areas dummy variable 
is inserted into the equation along with the other explanatory variables. The empirical results 
provide strong evidence that the Group Areas Act was creating a monetary premium on 
residential properties in the Indian residential are.as. The second model divides the sample 
into separate equations for White and Indian areas with the intention of establishing the 
contribution of land to overall property values. Empirical results concerning the claim that 
land values are higher in the Indian areas are not robust. However, they do indicate that on 
average, land values in the Indian areas were higher than in the White are.as. On the basis 
of these results, it appears that the Indian ratepayers had a legitimate complaint against the 
fairness of the property rating system in Pietermaritzburg. Furthermore, the measures taken 
by the City Council to rectify the inequity in the system are found to be inadequate. 
l
INTRODUCTION 
At the end of 1989, the Pietennaritzburg City Council approved a revised rating system 
which incorporated a new valuation roll. These changes caused a strong reaction from Indian 
and Coloured ratepayers who faced substantial increases in property rates as a consequence 
of the relatively large increase in property valuations in these Group areas. On October 2 
1989, The Natal Witness reported that the Indian and Coloured ratepayers were planning a 
march on the city hall to protest the massive increases in rates. This march, which took place 
at the end of October 1989, was organized by the Pietermaritzburg Combined Residents and 
Ratepayers Association (PCRRA) which comprises mostly Indian and Coloured ratepayers. 
In response to these complaints, the City Council has attempted to make several concessions 
to the aggrieved parties. The last concession has been to grant a 25 % rebate on rates payable 
on land. On April 18 1991, The Natal Witness reported that the PCRRA was dissatisfied 
with the City Council's concession and had begun legal proceedings against the latter. On 
May 4 1992, the Supreme Court dismissed the PCRRA 's application to set aside the property 
rating system in the Indian and Coloured Group areas, since the court was unable to quantify 
accurately the effect of the Group Areas Act on land values in the Indian and Coloured areas. 
(The Natal Witness, May 5 1992). 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the claim that the Group Areas Act created an 
institutional bias against Indian ratepayers in the sense that they now have to pay a 
disproportionate share of the rates burden 1•
1 The only data available for the coloured areas concerned 
their aggregate property values and rates income. Unfortunately, 
at the time of sampling , no data were available for the 
quantitative analysis. However, it is clear that both Indians and 
Coloureds use the same arguments in their protests against the 
City Council. Therefore, whilst comments are passed on the 
matter, the econometric analysis does not concern the Coloured 
areas. 
2 
Chapter 1 explains how property rates are determined in Pietermaritzburg. Thereafter, an 
attempt is made to trace the trend of assessed property values and hence rates increases in 
Pietermaritzburg. After examining these trends, a main hypothesis and a subhypothesis are 
set out. 
Chapter 2 is largely concerned with establishing an appropriate theoretical framework within 
which the urban housing market can be explained. The purpose of the theoretical framework 
is to justify the equations used in the testing of the hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 concerns the empirical part of this dissertation. It describes the data used in the 
empirical analysis and the choice of appropriate functional forms. The empirical results are 
used to test the hypotheses set out in chapter 1. Chapter 4 concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PROPERTY VALUATION AND mE DETERMINATION OF RATES INCIDENCE 
IN PIETERMARITZBURG
1 The determination of rates incidence in Pietermaritzburg 
At this stage it would be appropriate to discuss the incidence of the property rating system. 
Oldham (1990, p.1) identifies two broad categories of groups which are likely to express 
opposition to the property rating system. Firstly, business and residential property owners 
may have conflicting interests. Secondly, racial groups may perceive the rating system to be 
unfair if property valuations differ between residential are.as . 
. ,! 
,--- , / Property rates are determined in two ways. Firstly, rates are determined by a valuation roll
�
which values property according to the market value of land and replacement cost of 
buildings. This roll is updated every fifth year. The principle underlying the valuation of land 
is willing buyer/ willing seller. In other words, land values are determined by the market. In 
this respect the Group Areas Act played an important role because it segmented the market 
for White property from that of Indian and Coloured. Secondly, the City Council sets 
property rand ages for land and buildings each year. Therefore, although the City Council has 
no discretion over property values, it can determine or change the incidence by altering the 
randages or the relative value of the randages for land and buildings. // 
/ 
The main objections against the rates have stemmed from the revaluation of properties every 
five years. As the economic environment changes through time the relative values of business 
and residential properties alter, and when rates are calculated on the revised valuation roll, 
substantial shifts in the rates incidence occur. Prior to its repeal in 1990, the Group Areas 
Act exacerbated the problem because of an exceptionally high increase in the value of land 
in the Indian areas. 
With this in mind, it was decided to examine quantitatively what effect (if any) the Group 
Areas Act has had on housing and property values in Pietermaritzburg. Before embarking 
on the quantitative analysis an attempt will be made to trace the trend of property values and 
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rates increases in the White, Indian and Coloured residential areas. Then it is necessary to 
see how changes in the valuation of properties have affected the rates incidence. 
1.1 Changes in property values and rates incidence in the residential areas 
Table 1 shows the changes in assessed property values for the White, Indian and Coloured 
residential areas respectively after the implementation of the 1985/86 and 1989/90 valuation 
rolls. Property value has been separated into land value and building value. 
Secondly, Table 1.1 shows the changes in rates income and the effects of the changes in the 
randages levied on land and buildings in the residential areas for Whites, Indians and 
Coloureds respectively. The randages leviecl on the value of land and the replacement cost 
of buildings are shown in Table 1.3. Of particular interest is the manner in which the City 
Council has altered the respective randages for land and buildings, thus shifting the tax
incidence either away from or towards respective residential groups. For example, White 
properties on average have more extensive buildings than Indians and Coloured properties 
and the ratio of the value of buildings to land is higher. Therefore if the City Council 
intends increasing the rates incidence for people living in a White are.as, they could reduce 
the randage for land and increase the randage on buildings. In this way the rates incidence 
would shift towards the Whites and away from Indians and Coloureds. 
5 














































1989/90 31,93 78,99 110,91 
Source: Residential Rates in Pietermaritzburg 1980/81 -1989/90, City Treasurer's. 
Department, 1989 








New valuation rolls were implemented in 1985/86 and again m 1989/90. With the 
implementation of the 1985/86 property valuation roll, it is clear that land valuations had 
increased dramatically for all race groups. However, as Table 1 shows, those living in the 
White residential areas experienced the highest increase in land value - viz. a 320,9 % 
increase as opposed to the 180% and 136% experienced by the Indians and Coloureds 
respectively2 . Building values also increased substantially in the respective Group areas, 
2 This unusually large increase in land values in the White 
residential areas can be attributed to the fact that land in the 
White areas was auctioned by the municipality shortly before the 
revaluation and fetched very high prices. These were taken into 
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mainly because the replacement cost of buildings increased substantially. Table 1.2 shows 
that the implementation of the 1985/86 valuation roll caused the ratio of White property 
values with respect to Indian and Coloured property values to increase significantly. This 
would indicate a shift of the rates incidence towards White owned properties. 
Table 1.3 shows that the increase in property valuations was accompanied by a reduction in 
the ratio of land to building randages viz. 2,91-1,78. The effect was that rates income from 
land in the White areas decreased by 3,2% compared to decreases of 36% and 45% in the 
Indian and Coloured areas respectively. Table 1.2 shows that the ratios of White to Indian 
and White to Coloured income from land also increased. 
Income from buildings increased by 56 % in the White areas, whilst income accruing from 
Indian and Coloured residential buildings increased by 14 % and 32 % respectively. What is 
important is that the ratio of White to Indian rates income from buildings showed the biggest 
increase viz. 2,2: 1 (1984/85) to 3,0: 1 (1985/86). The overall effect of the implementation 
of the 1985/86 property valuation roll was that total rates income increased by 26,3 % for 
the Whites whilst the Indian and Coloured rates income decreased by 13,6% and 7,5% 
respectively. Thus it is evident that the White ratepayers bore the brunt of the rates 
incidence. 
The City Council shifted the rates incidence onto buildings which in turn resulted in residents 
living in the White areas experiencing an increase in rates incidence much higher than those 
living in the Indian and Coloured areas. The shift was caused by firstly, relatively higher 
land and building values and secondly, a reduction in the ratio of land to building randages. 
account when the property valuation roll was revised, which 
explains the large increases. 
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1.1.2 THE 1989/90 PROPERTY REVALUATION 
The implementation of the 1989/90 property valuation roll shows a complete reversal of the 
1985/86 situation. Land values for White residential areas increased by 17%, whilst those 
of the Indians and Coloureds increased by 115% and 135% respectively. Table 1.2 shows 
that the ratios of White to Indian and White to Coloured land values decreased significantly -
viz. 2,5:1 to 1,36:1 and 19:1 to 9,3:1. The increases in building values were relatively 
uniform with increases of 43%, 50,9% and 55,4% in the White, Indian and Coloured areas 
respectively. However, the overall ratios (property value) have decreased markedly, 
indicating the extent to which land values have increased in the Indian and Coloured areas 
respectively. 
TABLE 1.1 CHANGES IN RATES INCOME IN THE RESIDENTIAL AREAS (Rmill) 
WIDTE RESIDENTIAL 
YEAR LANO.INC %� RANDAGE BUILDING % .d RANDAGE TOTAL 









1985/86 2,73 1, 14 4,43 0,64 7,17 
1988/89 5,37 
-6%



























1985/86 0,12 1, 14 0,28 0,64 0,40 
1988/89 0,29 
88% 




1989/90 0,57 1,68 0,52 0,66 1,06 
Source: Residential Rates in Pietermaritzburg 1980/81 -1989/90. City Treasurer's Department, 1989 
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TABLE 1.2 RATIOS OF WHITE PROPERTY VALUES AND WHITE RATES INCOME TO INDIAN 
AND COLOURED PROPERTY VALUES AND RA TES INCOME RESPECTIVELY 
I Property Values I Rate& Jru;ome 
YEAR W:I W:I W:I W:C W:C W:C W:I W:I W:I W:C W:C W:C 
BN PN UV B/V PN LN 8/V PN UV BN PN 
84185 i,83 :1 2,23:1 2,1: L 13: I 13,S:I 13:1 2,2:L 2,2:1 2:1 12,7:1 13,4:1 13,L :1 
85186 2,75:1 3: 1 2,95:1 22,7:1 15,8:I 17:1 2,75:1 3,0:1 2,9:1 23:1 15:1 18:l 
88/89 2,5:l 2,75:l 2,6:1 19: I 15:l 15,8:1 2,5:l 2,7:l 2,5:1 19: I 15: L 16:1 
89/90 L,36:1 2,6:l 2, I: I 9,3:l 13,8:1 12,5:1 1,3:1 2,6:1 1,9:1 9:1 13:l 12:1 
L/V=LAND VALUE B/V=BUILDING VALUE P/V=PROPERTY VALUE 
Source: Residential Rates in Pietermaritzburg 1980/81 -1989/90, City Treasurer's Depanment, 1989 
TABLE 1.3 RANDAGES SET ON RESIDENTIAL LAND AND BUILDINGS IN PIETERMARITZBURG 
YEAR RANDAGE RANDAGE RATIO OF LAND 
LAND% BUILDING TO BUILDING 
% RANDAGE 
1983/84 4,28 1,45 2,95 
1984/85 4,96 1,70 2,91 
1985/86 1, 14 0,64 1,78 
1986/87 1,36 0,71 1,90 
1987/88 1,58 0,83 1,90 
1988/89 2, 1 0,77 2,70 
1989/90 1,68 0,66 2,50 
Source: ibid 
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The rates income derived from land shows a similar trend. The land income in White 
residential areas decreased by 6% whilst the Indian and Coloureds increased by 72,3% and 
88% respectively. Table 1.2 shows that the ratio of White to Indian income from land 
decreased from 2,5: 1 to 1,3: 1 and the White to Coloured from 19: 1 to 9: 1. This indicates 
that the Indian and Coloured shares of the rates incidence from land have substantially 
increased relative to that of Whites. 
Rates income from buildings increased by 34 % in the White areas and by 29 % and 45 % in 
the Indian and Coloured areas respectively. The ratio of White to Indian and White to 
Coloured income from buildings decreased from 2,7: 1 to 2,6: 1 and 15: 1 to 13: 1 respectively. 
It is clear that after the implementation of the 1989/90 property valuation roll, White, Indian 
and Coloured shares of the rates burden from buildings remained similar. 
The overall increase in rates income after the implementation of the 1989/90 valuation roll 
for the respective residential areas was 8,6%, 44% and 55% for Whites, Indians and 
Coloureds respectively. Table 1.3 shows that the ratio of land to building randages has been 
on an upward trend since the implementation of the 1985/86 property valuation roll. With 
the latter ratio increasing, together with a 115% and a 135% increases in land values in the 
Indian and Coloured areas, it is clear that the rates incidence was shifted to people living in 
the Indian and Coloured areas.3
There are number of reasons property values have escalated significantly in the Indian and 
Coloured areas. Firstly, over the last decade, there has been a significant redistribution of 
income towards Indians and Coloureds. This has resulted in more Indians and Coloureds 
being able to purchase land and explains the increased property values". Secondly ,there has 
3 The 1989/90 property valuation restores the relative 
racial shares of the rates burden to more or less what it was in 
1984/85. The 'ups and downs' of market forces are bound to cause 
disturbances from time to time. The crucial question here is 
whether the Group Areas Act has discriminated against Indian and 
Coloured ratepayers. 
4 Over the last decade, State policy has shifted from the 
provision of housing to private ownership. The privatization of 
housing in Indian and Coloured areas partly explains increased 
10 
been increased population in the cities due to rural-urban migration. This population growth 
in the cities would increase the demand for property which in turn would drive up property 
prices. This should hold true for all the Group areas. However, the Group Areas Act, which 
until recently has prohibited Indians and Coloureds from purchasing property in other racial 
Group areas and has restricted the availability of land in these Group areas, has exacerbated 
the imbalance between demand for and supply of property and resulted in property values 
increasing significantly. 
1.2 Conclusion and statement of hypothesis 
Given the constraining nature of the Group Areas Act with respect to the purchase of land, 
it is understandable that the Indian and Coloured communities objected to the effects of the 
1989/90 valuation roll. The rates incidence has shown a shift towards land which, given the 
dramatic increase in the 1989/90 land values in Indian and Coloured areas, translated into 
their experiencing a disproportionately large increase in rates. The willing buyer/willing 
seller principle would appear to be an equitable method of dealing with land valuations, 
provided market values are free to adjust to the economic forces of supply and demand. 
However, it is clear that in South Africa the Group Areas Act provided a serious impediment 
to the efficient functioning of property markets. In Pietermaritzburg, there was a shortage 
of land in the Indian and Coloured areas and due to the Group Areas Act, the price of land 
was bid up. Thus the square metre price of land is much higher in the Indian and Coloured 
areas than in the White areas. Because building valuation is based on the principle of 
replacement cost, market forces reflecting the Group Areas Act do not play a part in 
municipal property valuations of buildings. 
Therefore the main hypothesis contends that the Group Areas Act creates a premium on 
property values in Indian areas. 5 In other words, because of the shortage of land in the 
property values. 
5 Recall that the econometric analysis and the testing of 
the hypotheses do not concern the coloured Areas. 
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Indian areas, property prices in those areas have been bid up. This has translated into a shift 
in the rates incidence towards the latter areas. 
In a subhypothesis, it is postulated that the shifts in the rates incidence towards Indian areas 
has primarily been caused by the increases in land values in Indian areas. Therefore, 
according to the property rating system : Land Value and Replacement Cost of Buildings, 
it is postulated that increases in assessed property values have p rimarily been caused by 
increases in the LAND VALUES and relatively less by increases in the replacement cost of 
buildings. Therefore in the models estimated for the separate Group areas in the following 
chapters, it is e,cpected that the coefficient for land in the Indian areas will be significantly 
higher than the respective coefficient estimated in the White areas. 
12 
CHAPTER2 
THEORIES ON TIIE DETERMINATION OF HOUSE PRICES IN URBAN 
HOUSING MARKETS 
2 Traditional theory on urban housing markets 
Alonso (1964) believes that traditional theories of urban housing markets are concerned 
almost exclusively with housing being a location decision of CBD workers. These theories 
basically employ a common set of assumptions when analyzing the behaviour of urban 
housing markets. It is assumed that a city has a single workplace where all productive 
activity is located, that a city is located along a featureless plain, transportation costs are 
proportional to distance and all land on which housing is built is identical. Traditional 
theories argue that housing is a single good which enters as a single argument in household 
preference functions along with other goods. 
Given the above assumptions, traditional theories postulate that households choose an amount 
of housing and a location to maximize their utilities subject to a budget constraint that 
includes the cost of housing, the costs of the worktrip to the CED and the costs of other 
goods. 
King (1976) and Kain and Quigley (1975) cast doubt over the traditional theories of the 
property market. They view a house as a disparate bundle of goods which consists of copper 
pipes, bricks, flooring and various neighbourhood attributes. King believes it is logic.al to 
view the household's purchases of housing within the framework suggested by the new 
Lancastrian demand theory. This Lancastrian theory is set out below. 
2.1 Lancastrian demand theory 
Lancaster (1966a, p.132) is of the opinion that consumer theory as explained by traditional 
theorists such as Slutsky and Hicks has had all the irrelevant postulates removed so that it 
now exists as an example of how to extract the minimum of results from the minimum of 
assumptions. He argues that all intrinsic properties of particular goods, for example the 
13 
protein obtained from consuming red meat, have been omitted from the theory. Therefore, 
it could be argued that traditional theorists assume that the individual characteristics of a 
good are implicit to that good and are not essential in explaining consumption behaviour. 
Lancaster (1966a) departs from the traditional approach which holds that goods are the direct 
object of utility. He suggests that it is the attributes or characteristics of the goods from 
which utility is obtained. Thus goods are regarded as inputs into a process of consumption 
which transforms the bundle of goods bought into a bundle of characteristics. For example, 
a consumer buys various foodstuffs and combines them to make a variety of characteristics 
i.e. different flavours, different nutrients and so on. Lancaster assumes then that consumers 
have preferences for characteristics of goods rather than the goods themselves. Gravelle and 
Rees (1981, p.120), like Lancaster, solve the consumer's optimization problem. The 
consumer will · have to choose a collection of goods which will yield the desired 
characteristics. The consumer's choice is limited by his budget and consumption 
technology. 6 
Let C = (Ci, ..... , C,) represent a bundle of characteristics. 
Consumer preferences can be represented by a utility function 
U == U(C) 
The amount of each characteristic obtained depends on the bundles of goods chosen where 
a bundle of goods is represented as 
Therefore the number of characteristics obtained is 
C; = f (Xi, ..... , XJ = f(X) where (i = 1, .... , r). 
There is no limit to the amount of characteristics r that are yielded from the number of goods 
n. However, according to Gravelle and Rees (1981, p.120), it is usual for there to be more 
goods than characteristics or (n > r). Therefore each good can be said to produce more than 
6 Consumption technology is the relationship between goods 
consumed (inputs) and the characteristics obtained (outputs) as 
a result of consumption of the former. 
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one characteristic but characteristics will be common to some goods. A cake for example 
produces characteristics of calories, taste, cholesterol and energy. 
The budget constraint is represented as 
where Pt is the price of the good XI< and Y is the level of money income of the consumer. 





) subject to 
(ii) 
(i = l , .... ,r) 
Gravelle and Rees (1981,p.121) obtain the required conditions for utility maximization. They 
do this by examining how an optimal bundle of goods alters when prices, income and 
consumption technology change. Like Lancaster, Gravelle and Rees assume that consumption 
technology is linear. This means that one unit of good k gives rise to {3ik units of 
characteristics i where f3u:. is a constant independent of the level of good K or any other good. 
Therefore the amount of a characteristic derived from a bundle of goods is the sum of the 
characteristic derived from each separate good contained in that bundle. 
(Equationl) 
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Gravelle and Rees (1981,p.121) have used a two-stage optimization procedure to solve Ci = 
fi(Xi , ..... ,XJ. Firstly the problem of an efficient choice of goods is solved.
7 The efficient 
goods bundles are determined by consumption technology, the prices of goods and the 
consumer's money income. Efficiency is independent of the consumer's preferences. 
The second stage requires selecting the optimal bundle from the efficient set. This choice is 
entirely subjective as consumers will have different preferences even if they have the same 
incomes. 






__..::;......--------�------7c1 0 (,.i ,,, 
Source: Adapted from Gravelle and Rees (1981, p.121) 
The above figure has two characteristics C1 and C2 measured along its horizontal and vertical 
axes respectively. Purchasing 1 unit of good 1 will yield {311 units of characteristic 1 and /321
units of characteristic 2. Therefore X1 units of good I produce /3l[X1 and /321X1 units of the 
characteristics, in equation 1. 
Therefore buying of X1 of good 1 will correspond to a bundle of characteristics in the above 
figure. Good 1 produces two characteristics in the constant ratio /321//311 • Since /311, /321 are 
9 Efficiency in this sense means that a consumer is unable to 
obtain more of one characteristic without simultaneously losing 
a proportion of another characteristic. 
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assumed constant, doubling X1 will double the levels of C1 and C2• When only good 1 is 
bought, OG 1 shows the combinations of Ci ,C2 produced by varying the level of X1 •
Similarly, OG2 shows combinations of characteristics generated by varying the level of X2
with X1 set to 0. 
Assume the consumer spends all his income Y on X1 and· is at C 1 in the above figure. 
Therefore, he will be able to purchase Y/P1 units of X1 and thus produce f3uYIP1 = C11 of 
C 1 and /321Y/P1 = C21 units of C2• Similarly, if the consumer spends all his income Y on X2
and is at C2 in the above figure, he will be able to purchase Y /P2 units of X2 and produce 
{321Y/P2 = C22 of C2 and (311 Y/P2 = C 12 of C 1• Therefore if only X1 is purchased, the 
consumer will be at C 1 = (Cu, C21 ). If all his income is spent on X2 , the consumer will be 
at C2 = (C22,C12) on OG2•
The slope of C 1C2 shows the rate at which the consumer can substitute C, for C2 by varying 
his purchases of X1 and X2• Any movement along C1C2 must satisfy both the consumption 
technology and the budget constraints. Any point reached on the feasible boundary C1C2 will 
be efficient. The exact position of each bundle of goods on the frontier is determined by the 
subjective preferences of consumers for characteristics. 
The Lancastrian demand theory appears to be very suitable for describing the demand for 
housing. The homogenous housing units as described by traditional theorists are fictitious. 
King ( 1976, p.1077) is of the opinion that housing is a disparate bundle of commodities -
brass pipes, Italian tiles, oak doors, security and so on. Therefore it would appear 
appropriate to view the household's purchases of housing within the framework of 
Lancastrian demand theory. 
However, there are some shortcomings to using Lancastrian demand theory. Firstly, housing 
is a durable good if not an asset. In Lancaster's theory it appears that he is dealing with non­
durable consumer goods such as bread, butter, coffee and so on. Assuming that consumers 
are subject to a budget constraint, it is clear that they have to maximize their utility. 
However, if the consumer exceeds his budget or desires less of one characteristic and more 
of another he can, in the "shopping basket" case, simply remove one of the goods from the 
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basket and replace it with another. But in the purchase of a house, the bundle of housing 
consumed is the sum of the household's consumption of each characteristic. Therefore, 
households seldom have the opportunity of buying individual characteristics as in the 
"shopping basket" case. Consumers have to choose from a large number of fixed bundles. 
They can modify these bundles by making additional expenditures, but the scope for changing 
bundle characteristics is limited. 
Therefore, like King (1976), Kain and Quigley (1975) believe it is more instructive to 
analyse housing markets in terms of housing bundles rather than using a single homogenous 
good (traditional theory) or good attributes as set out Lancaster. 
King (1976), Kain and Quigley (1975) and Witte et al (1979) view housing demand as the 
demand for specific bundles. The choice among quantities of heterogenous goods on the basis 
of preferences and prices subject to a budget constraint implies that consumers select goods 
in such a way that they receive equi-marginal satisfaction from the last rand's worth of each 
good. The notion of housing bundles implies that each consumer chooses from a large 
number of differently priced bundles, the one bundle that maximizes his utility. Therefore, 
it can be said that housing demand theory fits in fairly well with the theory as set out by 
Lancaster above, although different characteristics cannot be substituted or increased with the 
ease that Lancaster has suggested. 
2.2 Constructing Lancastrian characteristics for the housing market 
In order to construct Lancastrian characteristics from observable bundles (houses), King 
(1976, p.1081) ) obtains the relevant characteristics and then asks how these characteristics 
are related to the observed bundles. 
In his study on urban housing markets in New Haven, Connecticut, King combined observed 
housing components into Lancastrian characteristics. King assumes the housing bundle 
provides four characteristics. These are special structural features, exterior and interior 
quality, interior space and land, public services and neighbourhood quality. For example, the 
characteristic interior quality may include the materials used for the ceiling, floor and 
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window frames, all of which are observable components of the housing bundle. Therefore 
King has used proxies for the four characteristics described above. For example, under 
structural features he has included whether or not there is full sanitation, the number of 
garages, the number of bathrooms, basements and laundry faciliti es8 • 
King (1976, p.1081) admits that his characteristics may be inconsistent. For example, there 
is no guarantee that consumers necessarily consider a housing bundle to comprise just those 
four characteristics. However, one would expect reasonable agreement that the four 
characteristics represent different aspects of a housing unit. 
Kain and Quigley (1975) adopt a similar approach to that of King. They divide their 
explanatory variables into measures of dwelling quantity, size of the property and its various 
structural components, neighbourhood characteristics and structure type. 
Witte et al (1979) in their comparative study of urban housing markets in Greenville, 
Kinston, Lexington and Statesville in the USA use dwelling quality, dwelling size, lot size 
and neighbourhood quality as proxies for housing bundle attributes. 
There is consensus in the literature as to which observed variables can be used to construct 
Lancastrian characteristics - it appears that there is agreement as to which proxies can be 
used to describe the attributes that consumers desire when purchasing a house. 
In order to be consistent with related research, similar or the same proxies for characteristics 
have been used. Obviously, the number and types of proxies used differ according to the 
amount of data available. 
Data were obtained from the local authority concerning lot size, the extent of dwelling area, 





are used as proxies for 
swimming pool, a randage quality index determining the quality of materials used in the 
construction of the house, neighbourhood attributes such as distance to the CBD and 
educational institutions and a variable explaining neighbourhood quality. Thus the proxies are 
consistent with the literature and should prove adequate for explaining Lancastrian 
characteristics. A Group Areas dummy variable is also included depending on whether the 
property is situated in an Indian or White area. 
2.3 The model 
Triplett (1973, p.80) has noted a close link between Lancastrian demand theory and the 
method of hedonic price equations9 • A linear hedonic price equation divides the price of a 
good into prices of the components of that good. For example, a cake consists of the 
components sugar, icing, cocoa, flour and baking powder. The hedonic price equation shows 
that if a cake has the above characteristics then it will have a market value of Rx depending 
on the quantities of inputs. The regression estimates are obtained by having a series of 
market values for cakes alongside the characteristics of these cakes. A hedonic equation 
breaks up the selling price of the cake into the market prices of each component used in the 
production of a good. Therefore, coefficients of the independent variables can be seen as the 
underlying market prices for the components of a complex good. The individual coefficients 
represent rand values for components. It is possible by the use of proxies to capture the 
characteristic each component supplies. The selling price of the cake is obtained by summing 
the appropriate rand values of the coefficients. 
9 Hedonic prices are the implicit prices of characteristics. 
The price for a particular characteristic is determined by the 
price of the component which supplies the characteristic. The 
word hedonic is derived from the Greek word 'Hedonikos' which 
means pleasure. Presumably households derive pleasure when a 
characteristic is consumed. 
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In the market for houses, the hedonic price equation may take the following form 
sales price = a+Enx. +EaZ.+U. }-' I I I 
where: a is the constant term 
i•l /nl 
(Equation2)
Xi are continuous measures such as lot area, dwelling size 
Zi are dummy variables determining for example whether or not the property has a 
swimming pool 
U; is a normally distributed stochastic error term 
a is the marginal price of each Z; 
{3 measures the marginal price of the X; 
Marginal prices are obtained by taking the first derivative of the above equation with respect 
to the X/s and Z/s. The equation can be seen as a joint function which represents both 
demand and supply functions. In other words, the coefficients can be viewed as the 
intersections of the supply and demand functions for each explanatory variable. 
2.4 Problems with the model 
Witte et al (1979) argue that the observations described by a joint envelope function such as 
the above equation cannot identify the structure of consumer preferences and producer 
technologies. In other words, the coefficients of equation (2) only show the market 
information to consumers and suppliers and reveal nothing about the underlying market 
structure. Therefore Witte et al ( 1979) take the process a step further by estimating separate 
equations for demand and supply functions using Rosen's two step procedure in order to 
identify the market structure. In estimating a demand function, Rosen makes use of the 
household's level of income and consumer preferences. In the estimation of the supply 
function Rosen uses production function parameters and the level of output of the firm. 
Although this is desirable because it separates the above equation into demand and supply 
markets and determines whether or not the housing market is in a long-run equilibrium, it 
was not possible to carry this step out due to the nature and the amount of data available. 
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2.5 The use of the hedonic price equation in this study 
Equation (2) is nonetheless useful. The coefficients of equation (2) are marginal or shadow 
prices of given attributes of a house. The hedonic price shows an implicit interaction of 
supply and demand market forces. However, Rosen (1974), as seen earlier, and Goodman 
(1978) point out that these implicit market prices are not necessarily equilibrium prices. The 
hedonic prices determined are not necessarily long-run equilibrium supply prices but rather 
a set of market prices that reflect the composition and location of existing stocks of 
residential capital and neighbourhood components. High conversion costs of capital, 
consumer immobility and heterogeneity of the commodity do not comply with the assumption 
that a housing market is in a long run equilibrium. 
Straszheim (1974) however is not concerned whether or not the housing market is in long run 
equilibrium. He is of the opinion that it is more important to divide the housing market into 
homogeneous sub-markets. Most studies have primarily involved regressing house prices on 
housing stock and neighbourhood characteristics using data drawn from the entire 
metropolitan area. Straszheim (1974) argues that the urban housing market is a set of 
separate and dissimilar sub-markets. Each market is affected by different demand and supply 
influences which cause a different framework of prices in each market. In a single urban area 
Straszheim (1974) argues large differences are present in the kinds of housing available 
across sub-markets and in the demand for a particular type of house in a specific area. In 
Pietermaritzburg, for example, the Group Areas Act may have caused the housing market 
to become compartmentalized with consequent price differentials between the Indian and 
White housing markets. 
It is possible to observe large differences in the concentration and other characteristics of 
housing stock in a particular location. This shows that houses have been built over a long 
period when factor and output prices changed. Straszheim (1974), however, argues that even 
though spatial differences over time in prices may change the nature and concentration of 
new construction, the variations are not significant enough to make it feasible to destroy 
existing stock. On the demand side, it is clear that consumers have vivid preferences for lot 
size and other characteristics of housing directly linked to the observable components of a 
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house and that certain neighbourhood characteristics have maJor effects on the price 
households bid at any specific location. 
Returning to the analysis of the effect of the Group Areas Act on housing prices, it would 
appear convenient to insert a race dummy variable into the regression for prices based on 
data drawn from a broad geographic area. However, this does not break up the data into 
different markets. In other words the coefficients of the remaining independent variables will 
not distinguish between the prices of characteristics in the separate Group areas. Straszheim 
(1974) contends that the quality premiums represented by other independent variables in the 
equation for prices may also differ for different race groups. In Pietermaritzburg there may 
be a scarcity premium, particularly reflected in land values, in the previously designated 
Indian areas, where demand for property has tended to outrun supply. 
Indian and White households differ in Pietermaritzburg because of differences in income, 
family size and possibly tastes or preferences. The relationship between housing demands and 
supplies is likely to result in a very different structure of prices for similar units in the 
different areas. 10 
Therefore, the race dummy variable in the above equation would appear to reflect both the 
differences in underlying price structures and differences in the types of housing available 
to Indians and Whites and the sub-markets in which they are residing. Hence, using pooled 
data and a single race dummy would appear to provide limited insight into any possible 
difference between prices of comparable housing to Indians and Whites in different markets. 
However, the race dummy is useful in the sense that it will at least establish whether or not 
there is a premium to be paid for living in an Indian area. 
For example, it could be argued that because of the Group Areas Act, the supply of land was 
relatively price inelastic in the Indian areas. This caused the prices of property to increase 
10 obviously different White households also have different 
incomes, family sizes and preferences but, due to the nature of 
apartheid and the Group Areas Act, it is possible that there is
a vivid difference between race groups. 
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in the Indian areas. Goodman (1978) and Straszheim (1974) would conclude that a long run 
equilibrium price would exist if aP/iJCi was constant across the entire metropolitan area. 
Therefore according to the subhypothesis, one would expect aP/oCL(where CL is lot size) to 
be higher in the Indian areas than in the White residential areas. 
With this in mind, it would appear sensible to estimate separate equations for the White and 
Indian areas respectively. It must be stressed that there are sub-markets within the White and 
Indian areas, however the size of the sample collected did not permit analysis of the latter 
to take place. For the purposes of this study the urban housing market has simply been 
divided into two separate areas - White and Indian. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Lancastrian demand theory suggests that consumers derive utility from the characteristics 
yielded by goods and not the goods themselves. Gravelle and Rees (1981) have shown how 
a consumer can optimize his bundle of goods within a budget constraint. The amount of each 
good consumed is determined by the characteristics consumers desire. If it is assumed that 
consumers are maximizing their utility derived from characteristics subject to a budget 
constraint, the amount of each attribute consumed is determined solely by consumer 
preferences. However, in the purchasing of a house, the bundle of housing characteristics 
consumed is not as interchangeable as it might be in the case of non-durable goods. 
Consumers' choice in the purchase of a house.is limited to fixed bundles, and the opportunity 
for changing bundle characteristics is limited. It may also prove difficult to assert which 
components of a house yield certain characteristics and certain components may also yield 
more than one attribute. However, in this respect, the literature appears to be in agreement 
as to which component provides which characteristics. Notwithstanding these problems it still 
appears that Lancastrian demand theory is the most suitable when describing the behaviour 
of the urban housing market. The literature asserts that the entire housing market of a 
particular metropolitan area is very seldom in a state of equilibrium due to racial 
discrimination, workforce considerations and search costs. Therefore it is important that the 
market is separated into various sub-markets where separate equations can be estimated. 
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3 Sources of data 
CHAPTER3 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A sample of 320 residential property sales in Pietermaritzburg was collected from the 
Municipal Estates Department in Pietennaritzburg, covering a wide distribution of houses 
throughout the city. The sample did not favour any particular area, suburb or street in 
Pietermaritzburg. The city used to be divided into seven separate zones by the municipality 
for the purposes of local elections. The sample was taken from Zones 2 to 6 inclusively but 
Zone 1 the CBD was excluded because many residential properties have been converted to 
business use. Zone 7 is representative of the Coloured residential areas, but unfortunately, 
as stated earlier, this data were not available at the time of sampling. Lastly, Zones 2 to 5
represent the White residential areas in Pietermaritzburg. Since the data was collected, the 
Group Areas Act has been abolished and substantial changes in property ownership and 
values have occurred. 
Approximately 60 properties were taken as a sample from each Zone and about 100 from the 
Indian areas. 
3.1 Description of data 
From the sales record dated 28.02.1989 to 12.01.1990 data were obtained concerning the 
market price of the house, the land area of the property, the municipal land and building 
values and the age of the house. Further data was obtained from the sampled houses' 
respective building records. This data included a municipal quality index 11, the number of 
11 A quality index is a municipal figure assigned to each 
house concerning the overall quality of materials used in the 
construction of the house viz. the quality of window fittings, 
quality of roof, quality of ceilings, quality of floor. Each 
index has a respective randage value which is then multiplied by 
the extent of the house to obtain the rateable value of the 
property. 
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bathrooms12, the size of the dwelling area, whether or not the property possessed a 
swimming pool, whether or not it had been a state-owned hou.se 13 and the extent of other 
buildings such as garages, servants quarters, basements on the property and so on. 
3.2 Specification of the models 
F.conomic literature concerning hedonic price functions does not clearly indicate an 
appropriate functional form for the model. Problems with applied hedonic analyses of urban 
housing have been firstly the interpretation of the estimated coefficients in terms of demand 
and supply functions and secondly coefficient bias introduced by omitted variables. 
Linneman (1980) has addressed two important sources of estimation bias that occur when 
estimating hedonic prices for urban housing markets. Firstly bias .stems from the choice of 
the functional form of the hedonic price equation. The second source relates to the choice 
of an appropriate sample for estimating a hedonic function. 
3.2.1 PROBLEMS WITH DATA SPECIFICATION 
As discussed earlier, Rosen ( 197 4) has shown that the partial derivatives of the hedonic 
function can be interpreted as the implicit market clearing marginal prices of characteristics 
of a complex good such as a house. Hedonic price functions represent the locus of supply­
equal demand intersections for various levels of each characteristic or component. However, 
Linneman (1980) has pointed out that because many of the relevant housing characteristics 
are not obtainable14 and because the production of other characteristics tends to be a joint 
process (viz. bathroom and dwelling area), it is difficult to establish a precise functional 
form for hedonic price functions. 
12 The number of bathrooms turned out to be problematic as 
will be seen later. It was difficult to ascertain the exact 
number of bathrooms each house contained i.e whether or not the 
house had a full bathroom or half of a bathroom. 
13 These were properties sold to private owners at a special 
price by the State or city Council. 
u Not obtainable from the data collected.
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Linneman believes that because data used in hedonic price functions is not designed 
specifically for econometric estimation, a prime problem is omitted variable bias. In his 
study on urban housing markets in Chicago and Los Angeles, the data contained most 
relevant variables on structural housing characteristics and neighbourhood characteristics. 
However, the data did not include variables concerning accessibility to work, recreational or 
educational sites. Similar problems occurred in collecting data for Pieterrnaritzburg because 
it was not possible to obtain data about neighbourhood characteristics. Nevertheless, an 
attempt was made to include variables such as distance to the CBD and prime residential 
areas. 
Considering the above problems, it would appear likely that the market clearing prices of 
omitted variables may be correlated with those of included characteristics causing the results 
to be biased. 
3.2.2 PROBLEMS WITH CHOICE OF FUNCTIONAL FORM 
Theory has provided little restriction on the functional forms of hedonic functions. Most 
.researchers have used linear, log-linear and log-log functional forms. However, Linneman 
(1980), Goodman (1978) and Bajic (1985) have used the Box-Cox method. The Box-Cox 
method is a flexible functional form often used in the estimation of price indices. Linneman 
is of the opinion that recent research work which has specified the functional form of 
hedonic equations as either linear, log-linear or log-log should have examined the statistical 
appropriateness of these forms. He points out the possibility that there may be a bias in the 
marginal price estimates caused by an inappropriate specification. Box and Cox (1964) 
developed a statistical method which determines the functional form providing the best fit in 
terms of log maximum likelihood. 
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The Box-Cox functional form can be written as follows 
=logX if .l..=0 
The hedonic equation is of the form 
P = 130 + /31 X1 + 132 X2 .... + BmXm + e 
Using the power transformation on both sides of the equation the following is obtained: 
where P is price transformed by the power X1 and Xi represents the continuous independent 
variables which are transformed by the power X2• Z; are dummy variables which are not 
strictly positive. This means that they enter the equation as O or 1. In other words the dummy 
variables will enter the model in a linear form or when X = 1. 
Now, when X 1 = '-2 = 1, the linear functional form is obtained. When X 1 = '-2 = 0 the 
double log functional form is obtained. Similarly when X 1 = 0 and '-2 = 1 the log-linear 
form is obtained and when X 1 = 1, '-2 = 0 the linear log functional form is obtained. 
One can solve, in the above equation, for maximum likelihood estimates of the respective 
sets of coefficient and power transformation factors. 
In his study of urban housing markets in Chicago and LJs Angeles, Linneman found that 
the maximum likelihood function was significantly more sensitive to changes in the 
specification of dependent variable than to changes in the independent variable. Therefore 
he focused mainly_ on the specification of the dependent variables and constrained the 
continuous independent variables to linear or natural logarithmic forms. 
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Linneman concluded that the 'best fit' model was log-linear, with the property price being 
expressed in logarithmic values and the independent variables in absolute terms. 15 
However, Cassel and Mendelsohn (1985) argue that the use of the Box-Cox functional form 
is at the expense of other important goals. The goals of most hedonic studies is to estimate 
the prices of individual characteristics and to measure the change in aggregate price as a 
result of changes in the amount of an individual characteristic. Cassel and Mendelsohn argue 
that the coefficients estimated with the Box-Cox functional fonn reduce the accuracy of any 
single coefficient which results in less accurate estimates of single prices. Therefore, even 
though a Box-Cox transfonnation may provide the best overall fit, it might not provide the 
best measure of the desired price gradient with respect to a particular characteristic or set of 
characteristics. 
Because of the difficulty of carrying out the Box-Cox procedure, and the doubts expressed 
about the accuracy of the coefficients, together with the fact that Linneman found that in 
general the best fit was a log-linear functional form, the models presented below will take 
the linear, log-linear and log-log functional forms. 
Kain and Quigley (1975), King (1976) and Lapham (1971) in studies of urban housing 
markets all chose to use linear, log-linear and log-log functional forms. Kain and Quigley 
(1975) found very little difference among the various functional forms in terms of overall 
goodness of fit. All the equation specifications explained a very large proportion of the 
variation in the dependent variables. 
tS This functional form is the same as a semi-log or log 
linear model. 
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3.3 Model specification concerning the entire sample 
In the light of the argument in section 2.2 it is postulated that sales price is a function of the 
following variables 16 :
SALES PRICE (P) = I (X 1 , ... X6,Z1, ... 25, U) 
Where X1 = land area in m
2
X2 = the dwelling area in m
2
X3 = other buildings in m
2
Xi = the age of the property in years 
X5 = a randage quality index 
X6 = the distance of the property from the CBD in km 
21 = the number of additional bathrooms 
Zi = distinguishes whether or not the property was sold privately or by the 
state 
Z3 = a dummy variable ascertaining whether or not the sampled property has 
a swimming pool 
Z4 = a dummy variable for the Indian group area 
Z5 = a dummy variable distinguishing whether or not the property is in a 
prime area17
U is a stochastic error term. 
16 In section 2. 2 most of the literature has asserted that 
the housing bundle provides about four characteristics. These are 
structural features, interior and exterior quality, interior 
space and land, public services and neighbourhood quality. This 
study has attempted to follow the literature as closely as 
possible. For example, under special structural features Z 1
ascertains the number of additional bathrooms. X1 and X2 are 
variables for land and interior space. X5 is a variable which 
shows the quality of materials used in the building of the house. 
X
6 
and Z5 area neighbourhood quality variables. From the above, 
it is evident that the equation used in this study is very close 
to meeting the criteria set out by the literature. 
17 
This variable was subjectively determined. 
30 
3.3.1 FUNCTIONAL FORMS OF THE MODEL 
Given the functional forms suggested by the literature it was decided to estimate equations 




P - A + E.BiXi + EaiZi + u 
lnP - A + E/3iXi + :Ea{li + u 




Where P represents the sales price 
Xi represents the continuous independent variables 
Zi represents the dummy variables 
It is expected that all the variables should yield positive coefficients except for Zi., X4 and 
X6 which one would expect to be a negative function of the price. 
Z4 identifies whether the properties are located in Indian or White areas.
18 The Indian 
owned properties were separated because of the Group Areas Act and so the coefficient, 
according to the main hypothesis, should be positive showing that there was a monetary 
premium for living in this area. 
The estimated equations are shown in Table 3 below. 
18 This Group Areas variable is expected to serve the same 
purpose as Straszheim's race dummy which was discussed earlier. 
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TABLE 3 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE 
ENT(RE SAMPLE LINEAR WG-LINEAR 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD-ERROR t-VALUE COEJ.'FlCIENT STD-ERROR 
Constont -2540 1,009E4 -0,252 10,09 0, 106 
Land Area (X,) 7 1,787 3,977 0,000064 0,0000'2 
Dwelling Area (X,) 149 29,893 4,977 0,0014 0,0003 
Olher Area (X3) 118 38,726 3,0<!8 0,0013 0,0004 
Age (X,) -95 44.891 -2.IIO -0,00096 0,0005 
Randagc Quality Jndex (X,) JOO 19,805 5,057 0,0018 0,0002 
Distance-CBC (XJ -939• 765,438 -1,227 -0,012" 0,008 
Bathrooms (Z,) 35226 3441,345 10,236 0,30 0,036 
State-owned (z,) -34397 5097,670 -6, 748 -1,25 0,054 
Swimming-pool (Z,) 11761 3373,628 3,486 0,13 0,036 
Group Area (ZJ 19147 4435,289 4,317 0,21 0,(}fl 
Pri� Ari:a (Z,) 7967 2385,721 3,340 0,09 0,252 
R-SQ (ADJ) = 0,77 R-SQ (ADJ) = 0,88
n = 315 SE = 18686,390 n = 315 SE= 0,1971 
F-Ralio = 96,811 F-Ratio = 207,450
•=NOT STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AT THE 5% LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE 
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WG-LOG 
t-VALUE COEFflCIENT STD-ERROR t-VALUE
94,842 7,15 0,613 11,574 
3,377 0,12 0,028 5,389 
4,028 0,21 0,049 4,336 
3,408 0,06 0,022 2,689 
-2.031 --0,05'" 0,025 -1,832
8,597 0,35 0,099 3,205 
-1,483 --0,os• 0,030 -1,707
8,299 0,32 0,036 8,902
-23,176 -1,21 0,054 -21,825
3,521 0,14 0,036 3,373
4,500 0,23 0,087 2,791
3,604 0,09 0,025 3,790
R-SQ (ADJ) = 0,88 
n = 315 SE= 0,1984 
F-Ratio = 204,312
3.3.2 STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE MODELS 
All variables in the three functional forms were statistically significant at the 5 % level of 
confidence except for X6• In other words, proximity to the CBD is not a major consideration 
in buying a property. The coefficient could be insignificant bee.a.use the it is not necessarily 
the only place to which householders commute. Consideration should be made for proximity 
to educational institutions, shopping malls and industrial areas not located in the CBD. 
The R-SQ (Adjusted) were all satisfactorily high with the log linear and log-log functional 
fonns showing the best fit and explaining approximately 88% of the price variation. 
Tests for correlations showed that none of the variables were significantly correlated with one 
another. The critical F-Values in all three of the functional forms were well below the 
calculated F-Ratios which indicates that the regressions were overall significant. The Park 
test for heteroscedasticity proved negative which is substantiated by the fact that coefficients 
across all three functional forms were consistent with one another. 19
3.3.3 ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MODEL 
In the above models, the coefficients all possess the expected sign and their magnitudes have 
an economically rational interpretation except for the relatively large value obtained for the 
additional bathroom. The coefficients across all three functional forms are consistent with 
one another which indicates that the model is robust. 20
19 Transforming the equation into logarithms is a method of 
eliminating heteroscedasticity from the sample. 
20 The interpretation of the various functional form 
coefficients can be explained as follows. The linear coefficients 
show absolute increases in the dependent variable as a result of 
absolute increases in the independent variables. The log-linear 
coefficients represent semi-elasticities. In other words they 
measure the relative change in the dependent variable given an 
absolute change in the independent variable. The coefficients 
of the log-log functional form are in fact elasticities, that is, 
they measure the proportional change in the dependent variable 
given a proportional change in the independent variable. The 
dummy variables in the equation cannot be transformed into 
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Interpretation of the coefficients of the various functional forms of the model are set out in 
Tables 3 .1 and 3. 2 respectively. In order to be able to construct any analyses of the 
coefficients across all three functional forms, the mean price was used to predict changes in 
price as a result of changes in the independent variables. 
The land area, dwelling area and other building coefficients appear to make good economic 
sense. The dwelling area coefficient X2 is greater than that of other buildings which is 
rational since usually a greater quantity and better quality of materials is used in the 
construction of the dwelling area - viz. a concrete floor in a garage as opposed to an oregon 
pine floor. 
The state-owned houses Zi were sold well below their market value when they were sold to 
private individuals.21 Again the coefficients appe.ar to be consistent across all three 
functional forms. The same can be said for swimming pools Z3 - the coefficients indicate 
that if the property contains a swimming pool, the property value would be approximately 
Rll 000 higher. 
logarithms so their coefficients constitute semi-elasticities. 
21 They could purchase a property from the State for 
R13 000 and then sell the same property privately for between R30 
000 and R47 000. 
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TABLE 3.1 INTERPRETING THE COEFFICIENTS OF THE CONTINUOUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR THE LINEAR, WG-LINEAR 
AND WG-LOG FUNCTIONAL FORMS 
LINEAR LOG-LINEAR 
INDEPENDENT VARI ABLE MIN MAX STD P..IEAN ,.p FOR 1 SEMI-
DEV UNIT 6X ELASTICITY iP FOR 1 UNIT 4.X 
COEFFICIENT 
Land Area (X,) 162 5725 916 1147 R7 0,000064 RS 
Dwelling Area (X,J 39 411 57 )31 Rl49 0,0014 RI 13 
Other Buildings (X,J 0 254 49 59 RllS 0,OOIJ RIOS 
Age (X.J l 94 33 37 -R9S --0,00096 -R78
Randage Quality (X,) 2L0 560 86 426 RJOO 0,0018 Rl45 
Distance CBD ()¼) 1 9 2 s -R939' -0,012· -R969
I PRICE (R) I 13043 290000 382)9 80786
• = NOl STA TISTlCALL Y SIGNlFICAN 1 AT t H� .> � LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE
TABLE 3.2 INTERPRETING THE COEFFICIENTS OF THE DUMMY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
FOR THE LINEAR, WG LINEAR AND WG-WG FUNCTIONAL FORMS 
LINEAR LOG-LINEAR LOG-LOG 
INDEPENDENT SEMI-El,ASTICITY SEMI-
DUMMY VAIUAIJl,E .tJ• WIIEN Z = l COEI/FICIENT •P WIIEN Z = I El,AS'flCITY •P WHEN Z = I
COEFFICIENT 
Bathrooms (Z,) R35226 0,30 R24236 0,32 R25852 
State Owned (Z2) -R34397 -1,25 -R20i96 -1,21 -Rl6157
Swimming Pool (Z;) RI 1761 0,13 RI0502 0,l4 RllJ 10
Group Area (Z.) Rl9147 0,21 Rl6965 0,23 Rl8581
Prime Arca (Z,) R7967 0,09 R7270 0,09 R7270












The quality index coefficients are as expected positive across all three functional forms. 
As stated earlier the bathroom coefficient appears to be unexpectedly high. It is important 
to consider exactly what the coefficient is measuring. It measures the increase in the value 
of the property if the house has an additional full bathroom. In other words, the coefficient 
assumes that each property has at least one full bathroom. The model, in all three of the 
functional forms predicts that an additional bathroom should increase the value of the 
property by R24 000 to R36 000. However, it may be feasible to suggest that the cost of 
adding a bathroom, if additional plumbing and building costs are taken into account, is 
indeed within the range of values that the separate functional forms have predicted. 
The main hypothesis contends that the Group Areas Act created a premium on propeny 
prices in the Indian areas. It was argued that the Group Areas Act prevented the efficient 
functioning of the property market in Pietermaritzburg and created a monetary premium for 
land in Indian areas because of the relative shortage of land in those areas. The Group 
Areas dummy variable Z4 shows, after the remaining independent variables have been 
controlled, that at the 5 % level of statistical significance there is a positive premium. 
Furthermore, the coefficients of the Group Areas Act Z4 are statistically significant at the 5 % 
level in all three functional forms. Therefore it is clear that there is strong evidence in 
support of the main hypothesis at the 5 % level of confidence. The premium for a property 
in the Indian areas varies from R16 965 to R19 147 depending on the specification of the 
model. 
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3.3.4 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL 
It would appear that the explanatory variables in the model are satisfactory proxies for 
explaining the characteristics which households desire. Most of the variables seem to be 
economically sound and the prices for each implicit characteristic plausible. Each of the 
variables have shown how much households would be willing to pay for individual 
characteristics. For example, households would be willing to pay Rl 1 000 for a swimming 
pool. 
Straszheim (1974) has argued that the race dummy variable does not necessarily break up the 
data into different markets. Straszheim has contended that the quality premiums represented 
by other independent variables in the equation may also differ across racial groups. For 
example, Indian and White households differ in Pietermaritzburg because of differences in
income and family size. Therefore, a relationship between housing demands and housing 
supplies is likely to result in a very different structure of prices in Indian areas than for 
similar units in the White markets. 
The Group Areas dummy in the above equation would thus appear to reflect both the 
differences in underlying price structures for the types of housing available to Indians and 
Whites, and the sub-markets in which they reside. Therefore using pooled data as has been 
done above and a single race dummy would appear to be useful in the sense that it has 
indicated that there is a premium to pay if one lives in an Indian area. However, it provides 
little insight into any possible differences between prices of comparable housing to Indians 
and Whites in different markets. 
3.4 Separating the model into separate Group areas 
There seems to be a case for arguing that the Group Areas Act caused a premium to be 
established for properties in areas zoned for Indians which created an inequity in the system 
of property rating. The problem now is to establish which of the independent variables in the 
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model are causing this premium. In the subhypothesis it is postulated that the increase in 
rates incidence towards Indian areas has primarily been caused by increases in land values. 
Following Straszheim (1974) it would appear sensible to separate the sample into different 
sub-markets and estimate separate equations for White and Indian areas respectively. By 
distinguishing between an Indian and White housing market, it is possible to compare the 
differences in underlying price structures. This will enable the model to identify which 
characteristics of the property market are most affected by the Group Areas Act. Although, 
there are sub-markets within the White and Indian are.as, as stated earlier the size of the 
sample collected did not permit a further breakdown into smaller sub-markets. 
When the 1989/90 property valuation roll was introduced, people living in the Indian areas 
experienced relatively large increases in assessed land values compared to Whites, viz. a 
115% increase as opposed to a 17% increase. At the same time however, building values 
increased by a similar proportion for White and Indian areas - viz. 43% and 50,9%. 
Rates income, as shown in Table 1.1, from land in the Indian areas increased by 72,3 % as 
opposed to White rates income from land which decreased by 6 % . Rates income from 
buildings increased by 34 % and 29 % in the White and Indian are.as respective! y. Total rates 
income (from land and buildings) increased by only 8,6% in the White areas and a massive 
44 % in the Indian are.as. 
The land value increases in the Indian areas resulted in increases in the rates income 
accruing from land. The Group Are.as dummy variable has shown that there is a premium 
for living in an Indian are.a. Given that building values, in terms of replacement cost, 
showed similar increases across all Group areas, it would seem plausible to assume that a 
large proportion of the Group Areas coefficient must reflect relatively higher land values in 
the Indian areas. 
Table 1.3 shows that the ratio of land to building randages has been on a upward trend since 
the implementation of the 1985/86 property valuation roll. With the increase in this ratio, and 
that land values in the Indian areas are relatively higher than in White areas, it is clear that 
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properties in the Indian areas would attract a higher rates incidence than properties located 
in White areas. 
After separating the data into Group areas the subhypothesis will be tested. The 
subhypothesis is that the shifts in the rates incidence towards the Indians areas has primarily 
been caused by the increases in land values in the Indian areas. Therefore, it is expected that 
the coefficient of the land area variable in the Indian areas will be significantly higher than 
the corresponding coefficient in the White areas. It is expected that other coefficients in the 
separate models should not be affeeted by distortions in the property market caused by the 
Group Areas Act. In other words, the coefficients of the independent variables may be 
different across the two Group areas for the reasons put forward by Straszheim (1974), 
outlined above. 
3.S Model specification concerning the equations for the separate Group areas 
As in the previous model, and according to the literature set out in Chapter 2, it is postulated 
that sales price is a function of: 
Where Pw Pr = the market price of house in White and Indian areas respectively. X,, 
' 
X 1 = land area in m
2 for the respective Group areas 
X2 = dwelling area in m
2 for the respective Group areas 
X3 = other buildings in m
2 for the respective Group areas 
X4 = a continuous independent variable representing the age of the properties in 
the respective Group areas. 
X5 = a randage quality index for both Group areas. 
X6 = the distance of the property from the CBD in White areas. 
22
22 It was attempted to use this variable in the Indian area 
equation but this proved to be problematic. 
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21 = a dummy variable representing the number of additional bathrooms per 
house in the respective Group areas. 
Zz = a dummy variable denoting whether or not the property is state-owned23 •
23 = a dummy variable indicating whether or not the property contains a 
swimming pool. 24 
25 = a dummy variable denoting whether or not the property is located in a prime 
area. 2s
3.S.l FUNCTIONAL FORMS OF THE MODEL
As in the first model, and in accordance with the liter ature set out in Chapter 2, it was 
decided to run regressions using the same functional forms. The only difference is that two 




Pw = A + ElhXi + Eoci2i + U 
P1 = A + E/3iXi + Eai2i + U 
In Pw = A + E,BiXi + EaiZi + U 
In P1 = A + E/3iXi + Eaj2i + U 
In Pw = A + E In /3iXi + Ea1Zi + U 




where Pw and P1 represent the sales price of the White and Indian properties respectively. 
Xi represent continuous independent variables 
2i represent the dummy variables 
23 This only pertains to the Indian area since no State­
owned houses were sampled in the White areas. 
24 No swimming pools were found in the Indian sample. 
25 It was not possible to determine which properties in the 
Indian areas were located in prime areas. 
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It is expected that all the variables should yield positive coefficients except for X,0 X6 and 
22 which one would expect to be a negative function of price. 
In the light of the subhypothesis, it is expected that the coefficient of X, , which represents 
the prices of the respective land values per square metre, should be significantly higher in 
the Indian than in the White areas. The coefficients of the variables X2 and X3 should be 
unaffected by the Group Areas Act.26 The estimated equations are shown in Table 3.3 
below. 
26 If there is a shortage of land in the Indian areas, there 
could also be a scarcity premium for existing buildings in these 
areas. However, this does not affect the subhypothesis since 
rates incidence on buildings is determined by the replacement 
cost of buildings. 
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TABLE 3.3 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE SEPARATE GROUP AREAS 
WHITE AREA LINEAR-LINEAR LOG-LINEAR 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE COEFFIClENT STD ERROR t·VALUE COEFFIClENT STD ERROR 
Constant -30233 2.979E4 -1,015 10,081 0,305 
Land AreQ {X,) 7 2,062 3,245 0,00006 0,00002 
Dwelling Area (X,) 189 40,138 4,708 0,0015 0,0004 
Other A�a (X,) 109 44,302 2,461 0,0013 0,0005 
Age (X,) -70'" 54,678 -1,284 -0,0009* 0,0006 
Randage Quality lnd�x (Xs) 148 62,040 2,390 0,0017 0,0006 
Distance CBD (}(.;) -1000• 891,982 -1, 121 -0,0121 • 0,009 
Bathroom (Z,) 31321 3994,894 7,840 0,28 0,041 
Swimming Pool (z,) 11425 3787,163 3,017 0,12 0,039 
Prime Area (Zs) 9922 3217,871 3,084 0,11 0,033 
R-SQ (ADJ) = 0,70 R-5Q (ADJ) = 0,65 
n = 220 SE = 20800,054 n = 220 SE = 0,2129 
INDIAN AREA F-Ratio = 54.97 F-Ratio = 48,061 
INDEPENDENT VARI ABLE COEFF1CIENT STD ERROR t-VALUE COEFFICIENT STD ERROR 
Constant 8723• l,60E4 0,545 10,I:3 0,261 
Land Area (X,) 7• 6,712 1,094 0, 000094 .. 0,0001 
Dwelling A�a (Xi) 29• 30,975 0,951 0 ,00064• 0,00006 
Other Ar¢a (X,) 221 84,240 2,621 0,002• 0,001 
Age (XJ -985 388,175 -2,538 -0,013 0,006 
Randagt Quality lnd�x (Xs) 96 17,S 13 5,509 0,0016 0,0003 
Bathroom (Z,) 110882 9384,950 11,815 0,80 0,153 
Slate-owned {Z,) -35891 2454,910 -14,620 -t,25 0,041 
R-SQ (ADJ) = 0,9262 R-SQ (ADJ) = 0,9596
n = 99 SE= 87 88,21 n = 99 SE ; 0,143.S49
F-Ralio = 132,105 F-Ratio = 249,002
• = NOT STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AT THE 5% LEVEL OF CONRDENCE 
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LOG-LOG 
t-VALUE COEFFICIENT STD ERROR t•VALUE 
33,055 3,94 1,865 2,115 
3,000 0,10 0,034 2,818 
3,471 0,23 0,066 3,530 
2,954 0,13 0,036 3,549 
-1,606 --0,04• 0,036 -1,201
2,785 0,83 0,294 2,838
-1,323 -0,07• 0,035 -1,928
6,870 0,28 O,Q.IO 6,927
3,183 0,13 0,039 3,363
3,481 0,10 0,033 3,081
R-SQ (ADI) = 0,66
n = 220 SE = 0,214
F-Ratio = 48,818
t-VALUE COEmCIENT STD ERROR t-VALUE
38,792 61,85 2,602 23,763
0,859 0,16 0,047 3,314
1,267 0,27 0;061 4,419
1,446 0,02• 0,022 0,863
-2,035 -0, 13 0,029 -4,339
5,659 0,54 0,101 5,399
5,215 0,14 1,806 8,023
-31,174 --0, 18 0,478 -39,170
R-5Q (ADJ) = 0,97
n = 99 SE= 0,1371
F-Ra1io = 446,254
3.5.2 STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE MODELS 
3.5.2.1 The White Areas 
All variables in the three functional forms were statistically significant at the 5 % level of 
confidence except for distance from the CBD X6 and age X4 • The distance from the CBD 
is probably insignificant for the same reasons as set out in 3.3.2. The age coefficient X4 as 
set out in 3.3.2 could be argued to be a non-linear function of price. This is especially so 
in the White areas where the ages of properties range from seven years to ninety-four years. 
The R-SQ (Adjusted) were able to explain just under 70% of price variation with all three 
functional forms showing a 'good fit'. Tests for correlation showed that none of the 
variables were significantly correlated with one another. The critical F-Values were all well 
below the calculated F-Ratio which indicates that regressions were overall significant. Tests 
for heteroscedasticity proved negative which is substantiated by the fact that coefficients 
across all the functional forms were consistent with one another. 
3.5.2.2 The Indian Areas 
Initially the estimation of this model proved difficult, with a large number of the independent 
variables turning out to be insignificant. The Park test confirmed heteroscedasticity and the 
method of generalised least squares was used to eliminate heteroscedas.ticity. However this 
only proved successful with the log-log functional form. Therefore, the only meaningful 
comparison between the White and Indian markets is between the models estimated in the 
log-log functional form. 
The R-SQ (Adjusted) is very high and shows that 97% of the price variation is explained by 
the independent variables. The calculated F-Ratio was well above the critical F-Value which 
indicates that the equation is statistically sound. Tests for correlation showed that none of 
the independent variables were significantly related to one another. 
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3.5 .3 ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE MODELS 
In the White area equation, the coefficients all possessed the expected sign and the 
magnitudes of the coefficients all appeared to be economically rational. As in the first 
model, the coefficients across all three functional forms were consistent with one another 
which indicates that the model is robust. 
Interpretations of the coefficients of the various functional forms of the model are set out in 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5. As in the interpretation of the first model, the mean property price of 
the respective Group areas was used to predict changes in price as a result of changes in the 
independent variables. 
As explained in the previous section, the linear and log-linear functional forms of the model 
estimated for the Indian areas were not statistically sound. Therefore, it would prove futile 
t.o make any comparisons of the two models across the latter two functional forms. The only 
functional form which allows any feasible comparison is the log-log functional form. 
The model for the Indian areas in the log-log functional form appears to make good 
economic sense. The only variable not significant at the 5 % level of confidence was other 
buildings X3 • All the other coefficients were significant at the 5 % level of confidence and all 
possessed the appropriate sign.
It is interesting to note that age X4 was significant in the Indian areas and insignificant in the 
White areas. This could be explained by looking at the mean ages of houses in the White 
and Indian areas respectively. The mean age for houses in the White areas is 50 years and 
the Indian areas only 6 years. It was argued that the age of the property is not a linear 
function of the price in the White areas due t.o the large range of property ages in that area. 
However, because the mean age of properties in the Indian areas is relatively low compared 
to the White areas, age in this situation could in fact be a linear function of the price. In 
other words, in the Indian areas, houses do not possess any 'rustic' appeal simply because 
they are very new. 
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The randage quality-index in the White areas is notice.ably higher than in the Indian areas. 
This is probably because of the superior quality of materials used in the construction of 
houses in the White areas. This could be an indication of the lower income levels of Indians 
relative to Whites. 
The bathroom coefficient in both models also appears to be economically sound. The 
coefficient is lower in the Indian areas which again could be an indication of the lower 
income levels of Indians. In other words, those living in the Indian areas have constructed 
bathrooms of a smaller size and lower quality which would meet a demand for relatively 
cheaper housing. However as mentioned in an earlier footnote, ascertaining the exact number 
of bathrooms was problematic, and so it is probably not worth deriving too many conclusions 
from this result. 
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TABLE 3.4 INTERPRETING IBE COEFFICIENTS OF THE CONTINUOUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR THE LINEAR, LOG-LINEAR 
AND LOG-LOG FUNCTIONAL FORMS OF THE WHITE AND INDIAN AREAS RESPECTIVELY 
WHITE AREA LINEAR LOG-LINEAR LOG-LOG 
INDEPENDENT VARI ABLE MIN MAX STD MEAN Al"FOKl SEMI- ELASTICITY AP FOR 1 UNIT 
DEV UNIT aX ELASTICITY aP FOK 1 UNIT AX COEFJilCIENT AX 
COEFF1CIENT 'l, 
Land m1 (X,) 162 5115 932 1462 R7 0,00006 R5 0,J0 R6 
Dwelling Area rd tx,) 81 411 48 !S3 R\119 0,00 I 5 R137 0,23 Rl37 
Other Buildings rrr (X,) 15 227 40 79 RI09 0,0013 RIIS 0,13 RllS 
Age years (X.) 7 94 31 so -R70 .. -0,0009+ -R82 --0,04• -R72
Randagc Quality Index (X,) JU50 R560 RJ0 R463 Rl48 0,0017 Rl55 0,83 Rl63 
DislllBCc CBD (X.) I 9 2 5 -1000" --0,0121 + -RI 104 --0,07+ -Rl2TJ
PRICE (Rands) 13700 190000 37315 91239 LINEAR LOG-LINEAR LOG-LOG 
INDIAN AREA MIN MAX STD MEAN .&PFORI SEMI- ELASTlCITY £1' FOR I UNIT 
DEV UNIT AX ELASTICITY 4P FOR 1 UNIT AX CO-EFJilCIENT .u 
COEFFICIENT % 
Land rrr (X,) 180 1101 218 442 R7+ 0,000094" RS 0,16 R21 
Dwelling Area (X,) 39 305 45 112 RW• 0,00064• R38 0,27 Rl93 
Other Buildings (X,) 0 90 IS 10 R221 0,002• Rll7 0,02• Rll 
Ag� (X..) I 24 4 6 -R985 -0,013 -R705 --0,13 -Rl173
Randage Quality lnde x (X.) 210 480 111 345 R96 0,016 R940 0,54 R92
PRICE (Rands) 13403 200000 31903 58762 
• = NCYf STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AT THE 5% LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE
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TABLE 3.5 INTERPRETING TIIE COEFFICIENTS OF THE INDEPENDENT DUMMY VARIABLES FOR 
THE LINEAR, LOG-LINEAR AND LOG-WG FUNCTIONAL FORMS IN THE WHITE 
AND INDIAN AREA EQUATION 
WHITE AREA LINEAR LOG-LINEAR LOG-LOG 
INDEPENDENT DUMMY AP WHEN Z = I SEMI-ELASTICITY t.P WHEN Z = 1 SEMI-ELASTICITY t.P WHEN Z = I 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT COEPFICIENT 
Bathrooms (Z,J R312'.JI 0,28 R25546 0,28 R25546 
Swimming Pool (Z,) RI 1425 0,12 R10949 0,13 R11860 
Prime Area (Zs) R9922 0,11 RI0036 0,10 R9124 
MEAN PRICE R91239 
INDIAN AREA LINEAR LOG-LINEAR LOG-LOG 
INDEPENDENT DUMMY t.P WHEN Z = 1 SEMI-ELASTICITY t.P WHEN Z = I SEMI-ELASTICITY t.P WHEN Z = t 
VARIAHl,E COEl<'l<'ICIENT COEFFICIENT 
Bathrooms (Z1J RI 10882 0,80 R47009 0,14 R8226 
Stalc-owncJ (Zi) -R35891 -1,25 -Rl4690 -0,18 -Rt0576
MEAN PRICE R58762
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The state-owned houses coefficient 2-i, indicates that the State or Council are selling the 
properties at RIO 576( 18 % ) below me.an value. This is reasonably consistent with the 
findings in the first model. The swimming pool coefficient Z3 and the prime area coefficient 
Z5 also prove to be consistent with the first model and make good economic sense. 
If one now looks at the dwelling area coefficients X2 for the respective Group areas, the 
models estimates that dwelling area per square meter is also higher in the Indian areas than 
in the White areas. As stated in footnote 27, there may also be a scarcity premium on 
existing buildings as a result of the shortage of land in the Indian areas. This does not affect 
the argument concerning the inequity of the of the rates incidence system, however, as this 
is based on replacement cost of buildings and not on the market value. 
The subhypothesis postulated that the shift in the rates incidence towards Indian areas had 
primarily been caused by increases in land values in the Indian areas. Therefore, in the two 
models above, one would expect the coefficient for land X1 in the Indian areas to be 
significantly higher than the corresponding coefficient in the White areas. It is clear from 
Table 3.4 that there is evidence to support the subhypothesis. In the log-log estimates, the 
coefficient for land area X1 is 0, 10 in the White areas whilst it is 0, 16 in the Indian areas. 
Initially this does not seem significantly higher, but important differences emerge if the cost 
of land per square metre is calculated using the mean land and property values of the 
respective Group areas.27 The price of land in the Indian areas is at R21/m2 which is 350% 
higher than in the White areas where it is R6/m2•28
n The calculation is shown as follows: 
c = (AP/P)/(AL/L) 
c =AP/AL * L/P 
c * P/L = AP/AL 
0,10 * (91239/1462) = 6 (for the White areas)
0,16 * (58762/442) = 21 (for the Indian areas)
Where Pis mean property price, Lis mean land area, AP/AL is the 
change in property price with respect to a unit change in land 
area and c are the coefficients obtained from the log-log 
estimates. 
28 It is obvious that these values are well below the prices 
that one would expect to pay when buying land. It must be noted 
that the above values are only measuring the land per se. They 
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Table 3.6 shows estimates of rates payable on land using the mean areas of the land for the 
entire sample, the White areas and the Indian areas respectively. The Table shows two 
values of land for each of the three sample sizes. The first value is calculated by using the 
Indian per square metre price of land and the second value the White per square metre price. 
These prices were obtained from log-log functional forms of the separate models estimated. 
Table 3.6 shows that land values in the White are.as are noticeably higher when the price of 
land per square metre for the Indian areas is used - viz. R30 702 as opposed to RS 772. 
Similarly the price of land is noticeably lower in the Indian areas when the price of land in 
the White areas is used - viz. R2 652 vs R9 282. 
The randage set on land by the City Council is 1,68 % of land value. Given the significantly 
higher price of land in the Indian areas, it is evident from the examples above, that a greater 
proportion of the rate incidence will devolve upon the Indian community. Table 3.6 shows 
that in all three Group areas Indian ratepayers would have to pay substantially more than 
White ratepayers in rates from land. In other words, if land in the White areas was valued 
at the same price as land in the Indian areas, Whites would have to pay substantially higher 
rates. Alternatively, if land in the Indian areas was valued at the same rate per square metre 
as land in the White areas Indian ratepayers would pay substantially less in property taxes. 
The City Council, as stated earlier, in response to the Indian ratepayers' complaints about 
the inequitable rating system, granted a 25% rebate on rates from land. There is no rebate 
granted concerning rates from buildings. Even after this 25 % rebate, it is clear from Table 
3.6 that the Indian ratepayers are still experiencing a relatively greater share of the rates 
burden than White ratepayers. This is the reason why a Supreme Court case concerning the 
rates system has taken place. Thus the measure taken by the City Council to make the 
property rating system more equitable would appear to be far from adequate. 
Table 3.6 shows that if the City Council were to grant a rebate of around 72 % on rates 
payable on land, then the rates incidence on land would be made equitable. 
are not accounting for neighbourhood attributes and topography 
which increases the value of the land. 
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TABLE 3.6 ESTIMATES OF INDIAN/WHITE LAND RATE DIFFERENTIALS USING THE PRICE /M
2 
OF LAND ESTIMATED BY THE 
SEPARATE MODELS 
MEAN LAND A.REA IN ESTIMATED LAND VALUE VALUE CITY RATES PAYABLE CITY NETRATF.S RATES 
Ml IN /M' COUNCIL COUNCIL25% PAYABLE BY PAYABLE BY 
RANDAGE REBATE TO INDIANS INDIANS IF 
INDIAN WHITE INDIAN WHITE INDIAN WHITE INDIANS REBATE 72% 
TOTAL SAMPLE 1147 R2I R6 R24 087 R6 882 1,68';1, R404 RI 16 RIO! RJOJ Rll4 
WHITE A.REA 146:2 R21 R6 RJO 702 RS 722 1,68% R516 Rl47 Rl29 RJ87 R\45 
INDIAN AREA 442 R21 R6 R9 282 R2 652 1,68% RJ56 R45 RJ8 RIIS R44 
so 
3.5.4 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS OF THE SEPARATE MODELS 
It appears that there is evidence in support of the sub hypothesis. However, it must be stated 
that there might be a problem with the data obtained from the Indian areas. On analysing the 
data, it is clear that municipal land and building valuations are not entirely consistent. For 
example, relatively small properties often attracted much higher municipal valuations than 
larger properties elsewhere in the Indian areas. It may be possible that some variable has 
been omitted from the Indian area equation. 
Further, the results should be treated with caution since, in testing the subhypothesis, the test 
was limited to using only the log-log functional form which reduces the overall robustness 
of the model. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the study has been successful in as much as it has supported the 
subhypothesis that land values in the Indian areas are higher than in the White areas. Thus 






In Chapter 1, the determination of the rates incidence in Pietennaritzburg was discussed. 
Then it was shown that assessed property values in 1989/90 increased substantially in the 
Indian and Coloured areas relative to the White areas. It was argued that the Group Areas 
Act was causing a shortage of land in the latter areas which in tum resulted in property 
values rising as demand tended to outrun supply. It was shown that this increase in property 
values shifts the rates incidence towards the Indian and Coloured Group areas because firstly 
the randage on land is higher than on buildings and secondly. the overall property valuation 
is higher. An annual increase of 115% in assessed land values is almost certain to attract 
complaints from ratepayers. At the end of Chapter 1, a main hypothesis and a subhypothesis 
were postulated. The main hypothesis postulated that the Group Areas Act created a 
monetary premium on property values in the Indian areas. The subhypothesis postulated that 
the increases in rates incidence towards the Indian areas has primarily been cause<l by the 
increase in land values in those areas. In order to test the hypotheses it was necessary to 
establish a theoretical framework within which to explain the behaviour of the urban housing 
market and the determination of house prices. 
Chapter 2 attempted to establish this theoretical framework. Traditional consumer theory is 
unsatisfactory for explaining the demand for housing because it assumes that the utility 
derived from a particular good stems from the good as a whole, and that the characteristics 
implicit to that good are not essential in explaining consumption behaviour. Whilst traditional 
theory may be appropriate for explaining the consumption demand for certain goods, it does 
not seem suitable for explaining the consumption demand for houses. The most suitable 
framework was found to be Lancastrian demand theory. Literature describing the 
consumption of housing has asserte<l that households desire certain characteristics of a house, 
and the price and decision to consume a house are dependent on the characteristics it 
contains. It was shown how a consumer can maximize his utility subject to a budget 
constraint while simultaneously being able to interchange characteristics. Although 
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Lancastrian demand theory was the most suitable for describing the consumption of housing 
there are shortcomings, the most notable being that characteristics of houses are not as easily 
interchangeable as the characteristics of other goods. Therefore the literature has asserted 
that households choose, from a large number differently priced, fixed bundles of housing, 
the bundle that maximizes their utility subject to a budget constraint. 
The next step was to construct Lancastrian characteristics from the observable components 
of a house. There was consensus in the literature concerning which observable components 
constitute the characteristics which households desire. ln this dissertation it was attempted 
as far as possible to use the same or similar proxies as the literature. The most common 
method used in estimating house prices was the technique of hedonic price equations. This 
technique relies heavily on being able to determine the characteristics of housing which 
households desire when purchasing a house and explains why Lancastrian demand theory was 
used as a framework within which to study the urban housing market. Some researchers have 
taken the technique of hedonic price equations a step further by separating the equation into 
demand and supply equations. Although this is desirable, it was not possible to execute 
because of the nature and amount of data available at the time of this study. 
Chapter 3 introduced the empirical analysis and the quantitative testing of the hypotheses. 
The literature did not suggest a specific functional form for hedonic equations although most 
studies have used the linear, log-linear, and log-log functional forms. More complicated 
forms were available but seemed beyond the scope of this dissertation. The first model 
concerning the entire sample predicted that there was a monetary premium for purchasing 
a property in an Indian area. Nearly all the coefficients across all three functional forms were 
statistically significant and were economically rational which indicated that the proxies used 
for Lancastrian characteristics were satisfactory. Overall the model appeared to be robust. 
The mean price of a property located in a White area was about R9 l 000. The model predicts 
that if that same property were located in an Indian area it would sell for somewhere around 
Rl09 000. This result indicated strong supporting evidence for the main hypothesis. Although 
this result established that there is a monetary premium to be payed when purchasing a 
property in an Indian area, it did not provide conclusive proof that the property rating system 
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is unfair. The model used in testing the main hypothesis has not specified which variables 
in the equation are causing this monetary premium. 
The next step was to identify which characteristics of a property are most affected by the 
Group Areas Act. In the light of the subhypothesis, it was expected that the coefficient for 
land in the Indian area equation would be substantially higher than the corresponding 
coefficient estimated in the White area equation. 
While the equation representing the White areas was statistically sound, estimating a 
statistically sound equation for the Indian areas proved problematic. Of the three functional 
forms used in estimating the Indian area equation, only the log-log functional form produced 
satisfactory results. Therefore the only feasible comparisons made were between the log-log 
functional forms of the respective Group areas. Notwithstanding this, the models showed that 
land values in the Indian areas are significantly higher than the corresponding land values in 
the White areas viz. R6 /m2 vs R21 /m2• Although the overall robustness of the Indian area 
equation is debatable, the result has important implications as far as the property rating 
system is concerned. Rates incidence is determined firstly by a valuation roll which values 
property according to the market value of land and replacement cost of buildings. Secondly, 
the City Council sets randages on land and buildings each year. The assessed value of land 
in the Indian areas has increased dramatically, as has the ratio of the randage set on land 
relative to buildings. The empirical results support the view that land values assessed on a 
willing buyer/willing seller basis are substantially correct. However, if the randage applicable 
to White and Indian owned land is the same, this results in Indian ratepayers paying 
substantially higher rates on an equivalent property. This would give rise to a valid argument 
for a rates rebate in Indian areas. 
The 25% rebate granted by the City Council, according to the calculations in Table 3.6 
would appear to be inadequate. If the results of the Indian area equation are anything to go 
by, an equitable method of determining rates incidence would be to grant a 72% rebate to 
those living in the Indian areas. 
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The Pietermaritzburg Combined Residents and Ratepayers Association is unfortunate to have 
had its case dismissed by the Supreme Court on the grounds that there was insufficient 
evidence to quantify the effect which legislation had on land values in the Indian areas. 
Although the empirical findings of this dissertation have indicated that the Group Areas Act 
cause.d the rates incidence to bear unfairly on the Indian community, it might be difficult to 
use such evidence in a Supreme Court case where doubt could be expressed about the validity 
of some of the estimates. However the study has shown that institutional practice, widely 
regarde.d as equitable, in assessing rates on the basis of the market price of land and the 
replacement cost of buildings can be grossly distorte.d by government economic interventions 
such as the Group Areas Act. 
Perhaps in the long term, now that the Group Areas Act has been repeale.d, the property 
rating system will prove to be more equitable. In other words, as the racial barriers are 
broken down, the separate property markets might merge into one and begin to operate 
efficiently. This will restore the fairness of the willing buyer/willing seller principle. 
However, it would be unreasonable to assume equilibrium in the property market is going 
to emerge in the short run. In fact, it is unlikely that a long run equilibrium will ever exist 
in a property market given the various levels of income and consumer preferences. The 
Group Areas Act was an artificial rigidity in the urban housing market which further 
exacerbates the problem of attaining a market equilibrium. 
Nonetheless, with the repeal of the Group Areas Act, every individual is given the 
opportunity to purchase property wherever he desires subject to his budget constraint. This 
should at least result in property prices being determined by consumer preferences in a free 
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